The Paradox of Democracy
A textbook of politics usually mentions the following as a defect of democracy: Democracy operates under majority rule, where those in the numerical majority are powerful and they tend to ride roughshod over the concerns of the minority. It is a problem of democracy to be solved how to protect the weak minority from the tyranny of the majority. Is this classical theory true?

1. Why can the minority rule democracy?
When you observe the reality of representative democracy, you will find that the reverse is the case. It is a few pressure groups of the economically weak that cannot survive without any subsidy or regulation that actually control democracy.
How can the weak minority control democracy? Let’s simulate the control by means of a simple example. Suppose a representative governs 10 thousand inhabitants and they have equal rights to vote his decision, paying a telephone rate of 20 cents per call. Who will come out against his suggestion that he should charge every inhabitant 10 cents for subsidizing the weakest in the community?
If the inhabitants are economically rational, nobody will declare himself against losing 10 cents, paying 20 cents for call, while the weakest to be subsidized not only declare themselves for it, but also promise to donate part of subsidy to the representative so as to realize the subsidy. This is the mechanism for the economically weak minority to exploit the silent majority.
2. Why can’t the majority rule democracy?
Can the majority exploit the minority, as the classical theory assumes? Let’s examine it with the similar example. Who will approve of the representative’s suggestion that he should charge the richest in the community 1 thousand dollars for giving 10 cents to every inhabitant?
If the inhabitants are economically rational, nobody will declare himself for receiving 10 cents, paying 20 cents for call, while the richest to be charged 1 thousand dollars not only declare themselves against it, but also offer a bribe to the representative so as to stop the exploitation. This is the reason the majority cannot exploit the minority. The minority can control the majority rule based democracy, not though but because they are in the numerical minority.
Of course, it will not be the case, if participants in a majority decision are fewer. The larger the majority is, the less influence, whether preferable or not, the result has on each voter and the less significant he feels himself, the more are apt to abstain from voting, thinking the result will remain the same without his voting. In short, the more, the less powerful.
3. How to improve the voting rate
In fact, the voting rate among advanced countries is very low. It is because most of the silent majority consider the benefit gained from voting less than the cost necessary to vote that they abstain from voting.
Suppose a voter desires a bill B to be passed through the Congress. In representative democracy, he must face the following indeterminacy:
- Whether there is a Congressman C or not that pledges to pass B is indeterminate.
- Whether C, if any, will win the election or not is indeterminate.
- Whether C, if he wins the election, will honor the pledge or not is indeterminate.
- Whether B, if he tries to honor the pledge, will be really passed through the Congress or not is indeterminate.
However valuable passing B may be for the voter, its value will be reduced to almost nothing, multiplied by probability coefficients of these 4 uncertainties. This makes the opportunity costs of the time necessary for most of the silent majority to gather information and go voting surpass the benefit of voting.
We must decrease the costs of voting and increase its benefit, so that the silent majority can take part in public choice. The Internet can play an important role in reformation of election. The Internet removes many middlemen including the representatives as mere transmitters of public opinion. Internet voting enables direct democracy, reduces the indeterminacy of voting and increases its value, while it decreases the costs of voting, because you can easily gather information and vote on the screen of a terminal at home. As a result, more voters will participate in the decision making process and democracy will approach the ideal.
Discussion
New Comments
This is a well-written and thoughtful article, but I disagree with many points. First of all,I’m curious of the definition of economically rational.
I can think of plenty economically rational reasons for arguing against a subsidy. Additionally, the fact that an elected democratic representative of the people can enact a local subsidy is not so much an aspect of democracy in action, but of our inherent, still-present system of limited monarchy, through which a representative can promote his or her individual agenda.
In 150 BC, the Greek philosopher Polybius first articulated his theory of government by mixed constitution, meaning a mixture of monarchy (the one), aristocracy (the few),and democracy (the many). His reasoning was simple: monarchies tend to degrade into tyranny; an aristocracy slips into oligarchy; and a democracy grows, over time, into mob rule. By combining the three forms, a system of checks would be in place to prevent any arm of government from crystalizing into its negative counterpart.
Polybius was not the first political theorist to realize this; Plato and Aristotle also suggested power separation. Aristotle labeled his three branches of government the deliberative, executive, and judicial. Here in America, we call our mixed constitution a republic, of which our democracy, and all the fairness it implies, is only a part.
A subsidy is economically irrational for society but it is economically rational for individuals to receive it.
A very interesting article. However, I disagree with your statements on direct democracy and the internet in several ways.
First, information posted on the internet is notoriously unreliable, and requires time to verify reports. The can often take quite a long time because rumours spread from one website to others, adding authority to the opinion without evidence to support it.
Secondly, most people (at least in North America) simply don’t care enough to research anything. They are far more interesting in spending time on immediate satisfaction, in general. I would argue that since the growth of the interent, the public has not become better informed about relevant issues.
Lastly, direct democracy has similar weaknesses to representative democracy. Corporations can lobby politicians to influence policy or they can advertise to the public. Most likely, the side with the biggest budget still wins. I do not know whether this is specific to late 20th century democracy (due to my ignorance of political history), but I doubt that it is.
Also, you mention the analysis of a rational voter. Are you implying that voters choose in such a rational manner? If so, it is subconsciously?
You said you were curious of the definition of economically rational. What I consider economically rarional is to decide to act when its benefits surpass its costs. The sum total of economical rationality for individuals often brings about economical irrationality for their society.
Representatives are unnecessary as mere transmitters of public opinion, but necessary as bill makers. They should argue the validity of bills each other before referendum. Congress can open an official site where voters can easily read the pros and cons of the introduced bills.
Even under direct democracy, the elite should not give away all power to the masses. Under indirect democracy the elite directly and the masses indirectly governs, while under direct democracy the elite indirectly and the masses directly governs. This filter of indirect uncertainties will prevent the rich elite from trying to control politics behind closed doors for selfish purpose.
This is nonsense. The weak minority can never rule…It is the rich minority that rules in all cases. Secondly, it costs nothing to vote, and far from being economically rational as you term it, most people vote because of one or two hot issues, like abortion, law and order…In other words catch phrases that produce knee-jerk responses. What’s more, low voter turn out in countries like the U.S. is more likely a result of what a sham the system has become. You basically have a one-party system posing as a two-party system. Both Republicans and Democrats represent the interests of the rich. The poor and working class have no representation but never realize it because the press is owned by the rich minority.
What I call the weak minority are those who could not be rich without the Government, while the silent majority consists of those who are rich or poor regardless of the Government.
In most countries, there are two Parties, the conservative and the socialistic. The former represents the interests of managers of fading industries and the latter those of labor unions. Both of them are the weak minority (Most of workers do not belong to labor unions in Japan).
I am not familiar with US politics, but in most countries, the masses that can be easily affected by mass media do not go voting. My theory applies to welfare states or development dictatorship. US is exceptional.
It is a palpable but often disregarded truth that modern democracy in large countries is dominated by interest groups, but this article goes too far in discounting the majority’s ability to infringe on the rights of the individual and the minority group. The fact that it can do this gives the Supreme Court its raison d’etre: to protect the rights of individuals and minorities against the majority. As the Democratic branches have little incentive to do so and much incentive not to do so, the Court makes the definition and protection of such rights its province. Consider Brown v. Board as a democratically unpopular assertion of individual rights against the majority, and Plessy v. Ferguson as an example of the Court failing to do its Consitutional duty: in this latter case it catered to the whims of the majority and rejected individual rights.
Japan will introduce a jury system. If normal citizens can participate in a judical decision, the majority may win the minority. But the jury system imposes too many burdens on jurors.
@Reuben Schwartz
“First, information posted on the internet is notoriously unreliable, and requires time to verify reports. The can often take quite a long time because rumours spread from one website to others, adding authority to the opinion without evidence to support it.
Secondly, most people (at least in North America) simply don’t care enough to research anything. They are far more interesting in spending time on immediate satisfaction, in general. I would argue that since the growth of the interent, the public has not become better informed about relevant issues.”
This is a real problem, let alone the fact that even 100% informed people can not know all about the details about each law that is discussed and do not have the time to get involved in detail in the law-making and law-voting process.
However, this problem can be solved if we imagine to have a not-completely-direct democracy, but to add one or two layers of delegated users between the usual voter and the lam making parliament.
Delegated users would be the ones informed and with enough time to participate in the political process.
Still normal users could be allowed to “bypass” their delegation and vote directly when they feel to.
“Lastly, direct democracy has similar weaknesses to representative democracy. Corporations can lobby politicians to influence policy or they can advertise to the public. Most likely, the side with the biggest budget still wins. I do not know whether this is specific to late 20th century democracy (due to my ignorance of political history), but I doubt that it is.”
I disagree with this point of yours.
Politicians can be lobbied in one way or another by the corporations and the power centers (army, research institutions) as the politicians are very few in number.
It is easy to lobby (bribe) one politician but very difficult to lobby (bribe) 1000 informed people.
If you have hundreds or thousands of delegated users and behind them millions of citizens who control them, it would be impossible to bribe them all.
Matteo Martini
Project iDemocracy
I agree with Matteo Martini as to the first part of his comment. Both direct democracy and representative democracy have their merits and demerits. Therefore we should select the merits of the two and invent a new hybrid democracy.
As for the second part I interpret Reuben Schwartz’s comment differently. Maybe what he meant to say is that under representative democracy “corporations can lobby politicians to influence policy” and under direct democracy “they can advertise to the public” so that “direct democracy has similar weaknesses to representative democracy”.
Still I think the Internet can overcome this weakness of direct/hybrid democracy. When a few companies monopolize most of the media (for example, only six companies are allowed to broadcast in a nationwide range in Japan), it is relatively easy for affluent industry or parties to brainwash voters. But the Internet has ended this oligarchy and enabled various people in various positions to publish and even broadcast their political opinions. So, it gets more and more difficult for the rich to control the public, as is shown in the current Middle East.